Introduction 7
In the lyrics written by Sid Tepper and Roy C. Bennett of a popular 1948 song, a broken-hearted 8 guy, who had the day before argued with his girlfriend, rushed to the florist to buy some "red 9 roses for a blue lady". His hope was that those pretty flowers could chase her blues away. In 
17
Since deforestation gives off nearly one-fifth (1.6 Gt) of global carbon emissions [2] , avoiding
18
it is claimed to be the most effective and cheapest way of control. However, until recently 19 deforestation avoidance had been kept out of international climate accords, mainly because of 20 1 The first time REDD came into the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) agenda was in 2005, when a mechanism for reducing deforestation and forest degradation was proposed by Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica and eight other countries. Two years earlier, Brazilian researchers had already come up with a similar tool backed by international payments for reduced deforestation. Between the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali, Indonesia, in 2007 (COP-13), and in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009 (COP-15), different REDD proposals emerged. As the scope of the mechanism was getting wider, its abbreviation was getting longer with the addition of "D's" and plus (+) signs. Chronologically, it started with RED -short for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation; next, it became REDD -when forest Degradation was added; then, it turned out to be REDD+ -so as to encompass conservation and enhancement of forest stocks through Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) techniques; at present, it has often been labelled REDD++, including reforestation and afforestation -that is, reforestation of non-forested areas [1] . Throughout this chapter, simply REDD will be employed, regardless of its several chronological meanings. However, afforestation and reforestation will be considered to fall into forestry-CDM -the branch of the Clean Development Mechanism suited to unnatural forests. within these countries [5] . Nevertheless, developed countries are not likely to transfer 1 payments to fragile states, where long-term efforts would be required to create or reform 2 institutions, strengthen governance processes and build capacity to deal with the new models 3 of forest management underlying REDD policies [2] .
4
In any event, disturbances of this sort rest not only upon the promise to serve different actors 5 and interests, but also upon that to bridge the environment and development agendas. While 6 this proposal sounds so appealing and distinct from past efforts in the forestry sector, it not 7 only has turned REDD into a successful idea, but also made it move from single (carbon) to 8 multiple objectives. Such a move, though, is now threatening and overshadowing the main 9 characteristic of REDD, which comes down to large-scale funding and performance-based 10 support. So far, the vast majority of both developed and developing countries lack concrete 11 strategies on how to implement REDD. Therefore, REDD finance remains unresolved, because 12 the cost of reducing emissions from deforestation also depends on the strategy chosen [5] .
13
Arguably, new strategies must emphasise carbon-stock protection [2] . Many studies have 14 indicated that, after wood production, carbon sequestration is the most valuable output from 15 forests [7] . However, a conservation market (REDD credits) for forest protection should draw 16 on a form of compensation for producing something additional (new carbon stored), rather 17 than on a reward for "not doing something" (not deforesting or not degrading) [4] . To begin 18 with, this is supposed to help the political economy of REDD build the argument for its public 
20
A further step towards that shift lies in emphasising a stock maintenance rather than an emissions 21 avoidance approach. This turns carbon conservation strategies from output (performance) into 22 input-driven ones. After all, forest sequestration of carbon emissions is primarily a matter of 23 forestland availability rather than of emissions avoided. If forest stocks are maintained or even 24 increased, they do not emit carbon, which is kept there. Although this might sound like a "two-
25
sides-of-the-same-coin" problem, the stock maintenance approach highlights the positive side 26 of conservation -the stewardship of carbon stocks -whereas the emissions avoidance 27 approach stresses its negative side -the discouragement or closure of activities causing 28 emissions to rise in spite of delivering economic benefits. Quite often, the latter is seen as an 29 unproductive strategy while the former might well evoke the production of some useful 30 commodity.
31
The commodity at stake is carbon storage rather than money. Yet, REDD finance claims that 32 economic and monetary incentives can, through price signals, alter the decisions of individual 33 land users and compensate them for foregone benefits from not converting or degrading the 34 forest [2] . Since carbon storage is increasingly needed, the demand for carbon credits is 35 expected to go up, thereby generating finance for forest conservation [5] . At present, however,
36
there is deep uncertainty as to whether and how a future international climate agreement 37 would value carbon sequestration provided by forests. In addition, when standing forests 38 compete with high-value agricultural and mining commodities, no one can ensure anymore 39 whether and how REDD funding -particularly output, results-based finance -would be 40 available in the future. So far, from current REDD finance, it is widely recognised that more 41 REDD Roses for a Green Lady -Target Setting for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon 3 REDD Roses for a Green Lady -Target Setting for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/57288 money alone cannot solve the deforestation problem and that the expectations of more money
Building upon fishery and forest bio-economics, in the BESF model emitters play the catchers,
23
whereas natural forests supply the catch -namely, the environmental service of emissions 24 storage. But unlike in fishery and forest models, the "catch", in this case, is an input rather 25 than an output. As emissions increase, so does the demand for their storage, and the supply 26 of forest stocks goes down. Thus, forest stocks turn out to be priced biophysically rather than 27 monetarily.
28
Such a biophysically set price is called the bio-economic exchange rate (ε). Found by dynamic 29 optimisation methods, it works as a shadow price measuring the shortage of the environmental 30 input (carbon removal) on demand. At any given time, the more (less) this service is demanded,
31
the less (more) of it is carried over into the future. However, the supply of current removal 32 stocks varies across the carbon sinks. Such spatial differences, measured by the bio-diversity 33 ratio λ, are called "exports" (Z) of carbon removal to elsewhere and correspond to conservation 34 2 In monetary economics, this relationship is known as the "quantity theory of money". "The quantity theory is a mechanistic proposition strangely alien to the assumptions of rational maximising behaviour on which classical and neoclassical theories generally rely ... It ignores the effects of the returns to holding money on the amounts economic agents choose to hold ... Money holdings depend ... on the opportunity costs, the expected changes in the value of money and the real yields of other assets into which the same funds could be placed" [11] . Of course, these remarks follow a Keynesian theoretical tradition, within which money is thought to be an asset rather than a token of bank liabilities to current account holders. Taking money as liabilities dates back to the days when bank-notes were "promises to pay", handed over at once as a receipt to depositors who had voluntarily given up gold to the bank, which, in turn, promised to repay them on demand [10] .
Carbon Sequestration 4 CO2 Sequestration and Valorization 4 Whereas Z means that the ecological burden of removing carbon emissions is "exported" to elsewhere, M implies carrying the ecological burden within an economy's boundaries over time [3] . The former translates into an ecological credit (0 < ε < 1) and the latter into an ecological debt (ε > 1). When conservation is low (high), compensation is supposed to decrease (increase), unless ε depreciates (appreciates). Since ε exchanges future carbon removal stocks (M) for current ones (Z), its rise (depreciation) means that Z is relatively deteriorating, whereas its fall (appreciation) means that Z is relatively increasing. Otherwise, for a given ε, Z and M vary positively with it (Figure 2 .b). Just like bond markets are grounded in existing loan supply (savings) and demand (investment), removal loans for either carbon conservation or compensation are backed up by the biological growth of actual stocks (removal supply) of forest sinks set aside for curbing emissions from economic growth (removal demand). Forest-wide, Z grows with λ, whose growth, in turn, causes ε to fall (appreciate). On the other hand, the faster (slower) the speed k of economic activity, the greater (smaller) the demand for M and the depreciation (rise) of ε should be. Hence, at this forestland level Whereas Z means that the ecological burden of removing carbon emissions is "exported" to 8 elsewhere, M implies carrying the ecological burden within an economy's boundaries over 9 time [3] . The former translates into an ecological credit (0 < ε < 1) and the latter into an ecological 10 debt (ε > 1).
11
When conservation is low (high), compensation is supposed to decrease (increase), unless ε 12 depreciates (appreciates). Since ε exchanges future carbon removal stocks (M) for current ones
13
(Z), its rise (depreciation) means that Z is relatively deteriorating, whereas its fall (appreciation) 
16
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To start with, the methodology sections will describe the BESF model, its geometry, basic assumptions, parameters, functions and variables. After that, empirical data on deforestation
20
in Brazilian Amazonia will be used to account for the model equilibrium points -both at the 21 micro and macro-scale. Finally, the aforementioned three scenarios will be assessed to determine, for either of them, how much forestland would have to be used for conservation
23
(REDD) and for offsetting carbon emissions (CDM). According to this allocation, carbon 24 sequestration provided by forests could be "paid" at its real, biophysical value, rather than 25 according to the virtual monetary benefits such an environmental service is supposed to deliver.
26

Research question and analytical framework 27
The creation of a market for carbon is based on the assumption that monetary payments for 28 carbon storage might make economic agents opt for forest conservation rather than forest 3 Dating back to classical times, the labour theory of value paradoxically stated that only when land (natural resources) is (are) running out is the maximum value reached. Therefore, any natural resource that gets into the market and thus acquires exchange value is dying out or close to extinction. So, exchange value lays bare that there is less of that natural resource than there was when it held no value at all! Later on, the neoclassical utility theory displaced the economic value to an even odder container: consumption. In the "utility world", the economic value was placed in the individual preferences for commodities. As preferences were a subjective matter, the economic value then turned out to rest upon the abstract basis of utility. From then on, the economic analysis has been cut off from its biophysical roots [14] . But as early as 1883, S. Podolinsky pioneered the idea of associating energy with value, as claimed by energy theories of value. These theories aimed at substituting energy for money as the only source of value. However, money is not particularly correlated with energy content, because there is no direct equivalence between low entropy and economic value [13] [15]. For instance, the monetary value per unit energy content of a diamond is extremely large compared to the monetary value per unit energy content of a lump of coal. Nonetheless, if all indirect energy flows were to be tracked down and accounted for, the discrepancy between diamonds and coal might not be so great [15] . By and large, economists have rebutted these energy evaluation methods because of the fear that economics might end up turning into a branch of thermodynamics [14] . Furthermore, as Georgescu-Roegen [13] once pointed out, the economic process has only two flows: an input flow of low entropy and an output flow of high entropy, namely, waste. If the balance sheet of value should be set on the basis of these inputs and outputs, one "would arrive at the absurd conclusion that the value of the low entropy flow on which the maintenance of life itself depends is equal to the value of the flow of waste, that is, zero" (p. 284). This paradox only vanishes by acknowledging that the true "product" of the economic process is not a material flow, but a psychic flux -the enjoyment of life. Thus, the economic value has both psychic (neoclassical) and physical (classical) roots. An entropy-oriented, energy theory of value would only account for the supply side of the process and neglect the corresponding demand side [9] . That is why the proposition of a shadow price for natural resource inputs, on one hand, and for the waste sinking capacity of the environment, on the other, results from an economic rather than from an energy theory of value [14] .
4 Although nature might well have other values -existence and bequeath -than use ones, non-use values are harder to estimate. Obviously, the use value is the one arising from the real -direct, indirect or optional -use of a given resource, whether in the present or in the future. On the other hand, the existence value is simply related to the existence of specific riches. The bequeath value measures the benefit that any individual obtains from knowing that, in the future, other people will also be able to benefit from the resource they have been left [17] . First and foremost, both non-use values essentially depend on estimating the preferences of future generations, which is not that easy to foreshadow. Moreover, non-use values resemble very much the intrinsic value of nature, which was claimed by Deep Ecology followers. According to them, nature had to be preserved for itself, rather than for satisfying the well-being of present and future generations. The intrinsic value is fully separated from any use value, even in the future [14] . Once these non-use concepts are difficult to apply, environmental goods and services are taken up thereafter in their usefulness sense.
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final analysis, the stock of physical wealth is an accumulated flow of throughput, which is a 1 cost to be minimised [18] .
Likewise, if carbon removal is the service to be used, then it must be valued by the biophysical 3 cost of delivering carbon removal stocks. Yet if not technically estimating price or value, a 4 method that estimates costs should at least be a fairly good approximation to price and value,
5
when markets are in equilibrium [16] . As known, whenever a commodity has a much higher 6 value than its cost of production, its profits will be higher. The commodity will then be 7 produced with increasing marginal costs until cost just equals price and profits are zero. The 8 opposite happens when the commodity cost is much higher than its value. Since the com-9 modity profits are lower, it will not be produced. The marginal costs then decrease until cost 10 and price are equal.
11
As real markets are seldom in equilibrium, cost and price are expected to diverge, so that 
15
are from each other (Figure 2 .a). As explained before, the greater λ is, the larger Z will be,
16
which, ceteris paribus, makes ε go down (appreciate); on the other hand, the greater k is, the larger M will be, which, ceteris paribus, makes ε go up (depreciate). The optimal balance 18 between k and λ defines not only ε * , in Figure 2 .a, but also the optimal level of carbon conser- Figure 2 .b, as well as the optimal growth (G(X t )) of and demand (h t ) for carbon removal stocks (X t ), in Figure 2 .c. Hence, any bio-economic distortion in carbon prices is communicated by the bioeconomic exchange rate ε. Figure 2 .b. Similarly, as ε * was the outcome of a specific value taken on by λ and k, this bio-diversity ratio (λ * ) and deforestation (economic growth) rate (k * ) will then be applied to yield the curves depicted by Figure 2 .c. It is these curves that set optimal deforestation targets and rates if forestland is split into deforested (u) and conserved (v) patches. 
Model assumptions
Z, M ε lnλ lnk ε Z M ε 0 ε 1 ε * ε * 0 0 ε 0 ε 1 Z * M * lnλ 0 lnk 0 lnλ lnk h t 0 X t G(X t ) h t (a) Removal market for carbon (b) Loan market for carbon (c) Z 1 = M 1 Z 0 = M 0 lnλ * = lnk * G(X t )
13
Despite their different biological and economic emphasis, both such models are concerned 
Model parameters and variables
26
Such an upper bound (K h ) depends both on space (λ) and time-related (k) variables (Table 1   27 and Table 2 ). On one hand, K h is a function of λ t (Eq. 
34
given off by its economic growth over time.
35
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As time goes by, the ratio of energy changes (ln k) to land changes (ln λ), measured by ε (Eq.
Building on standard bio-economic (forestry and fishery) models, it is assumed that such a 6 biological growth constraint follows a logistic pattern [3] . So as to hook the economy to its 7 natural strings, emission flows (ĥ t ) must be capped (K h ) rather than the growth of removal 8 forest stocks (Ĝ (X t )), which already are by nature. Capping emissions from deforestation, 9 though, implies that, at some former time T, when deforestation was negligible, there was a 10 maximum level of removal stocks, X K , associated with that least emission release (K h ).
t periods (emission sources) 
13
Therefore, so that Z > 0, j sinks must be displayed on an increasing biomass stock order. Likewise, so that 
Carbon Sequestration 10 CO2 Sequestration and Valorization 
The parameter K h is an algebraically found macro-scale bound to emissions. Actually, it is the 1 value taken on by the emission demand function ĥ t when X t = X K . Hence, the first step to set 2 K h is to find X K , which is arrived at through vector algebra (Eq. (16) 
8
Theoretically, these conditions not only allow the source-sink system to simultaneously reach 9 its economic and ecological sustainability, but also require it to remain sustainably stable.
10
Therefore, the stock level X K represents the "bio-economic cost" of achieving a stable state of 11 sustainability. Rather than a target to be complied with, it translates into the space-time needed
12
to make k stable (k j = k) and ε = 1 [3].
In Eq. (16), the bar over the symbols stands for the corresponding mean values in the last row 14 of 
27
Source: [23] 28 Table 3 . Forest conservation and deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon 29
Removal demand function (ĥ t )
1
In an emissions-saving (low carbon) economy, a seesaw balance between deforestation and 2 conservation of carbon stocks is expected to hold. At lower deforestation rates, the savings goes up. Thus, in order to account for these offsetting effects at any time, the observed removal 6 demands for deforestation and conservation are respectively determined by:
where ū t and v t are mean values for either biomass stock, displayed in the last row of Table 4 .
8 By summing Eqs. (18) and (19), the total observed demand for removal per period is obtained:
where x t = u t + v t and x t = ū t + v t .
10
The underlying assumption of Eqs. (18) 
(1 / -1286.16) + 0.07075414 × 1.01593216
Constraint III:
where S t stands for the instantaneous surplus arising from the gap between removal growth 6 rates (g(v(X t ))) and removal consumption rates (ĥ t ). Because of Eq. (24), S t ≥ 0, that is, at any 7 time, the rate at which removal stocks are supplied must be greater than or equal to the rate 
12
The optimal values for g(v(X t )) are displayed in Table 5 . They are now employed to estimate 13 the future supply of removal stocks (F (X t )) given the existing ones (X t ), used up in the present.
14
The estimated variable F (X t ) stands for an outflow-inflow ratio, defined by logistically con-15 strained rates of demand (numerator) and supply (denominator) of removal stocks (Eq. (25)).
16
The difference between F (X t ) and X t is the removal supply per time period (G(X t )). Starting
17
from the values for G(X t ), found by Eq. (26) and displayed in Table 5 , it is possible to estimate 18 the removal supply function (Eq. (27)), whose values are also displayed in Table 5 . 
G(X t ) = F (X t ) -X t (26)
7. Avoiding deforestation versus stock maintenance approach Table 2 , and by the figures in the last column of 
11
The impacts of λ on the equilibrium of removal markets are shown in Although in standard bio-economic (fishery) analysis, the latter is expected to be higher than 
27
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the greater the stock, the smaller its demand is, because In this regard, the equilibrium conditions in Table 6 had to be adjusted to fall within a stock 1 maintenance rationale. Since, in Figure 3 , the slopes of the functions Ĝ (X t ) (Eq. (27)) and ĥ t 2 (Eq. (21)) are never expected to be equal -as the columns labelled "rate of return" and "rate 3 of depletion" in Table 6 Figure 4 .b, and ĥ t , in Figure 3 , the stock 11 level satisfying this will lie slightly beyond (greater than) K -the stock level at which Ĝ (X t )
12
= 0 -and further beyond (greater than) X OA -where Ĝ (X t ) becomes equal to ĥ t , but turns 13 out to be negative.
14
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the greater the stock, the smaller its demand is, because the stock can only grow when its depletion is low. Thus, as is clear so far, Figure 3 illustrates a rather different standpoint, namely, a stock maintenance approach (Figure 4 .b). It has been argued that such a conservation approach favours the largest forest countries, like Brazil. Unlike in small forest countries, with only tiny remnants of forest left, in countries where large expanses of forest remain standing, stock maintenance represents a much greater carbon service than does avoiding deforestation [21] . In this regard, the equilibrium conditions in Table 6 had to be adjusted to fall within a stock maintenance rationale. Since, in Figure 3 , the slopes of the functions (Eq. (27)) and (Eq. (21)) are never expected to be equal -as the columns labelled "rate of return" and "rate of depletion" in Table 6 also show -within the feasible region (X 0A ≤ X t * ≤ X K ), RA equilibrium only calls for maximising some positive level of Y t , which could otherwise be warranted if the functions and were to have the same slopes somewhere. However, as the outcomes in Table 6 show, a positive Y t can be accomplished with a negative value for , provided that, in absolute terms, this is smaller than that for . Since < 0 is environmentally threatening, BESF equilibrium becomes a more stringent condition, because it calls both for positive Y t and . By minimising this positive level of Y t , then, the BESF equilibrium ensures that, for a removal demand function like h t , in Figure 4 .b, and , in Figure 3 , the stock level satisfying this will lie slightly before K -the stock level at which = 0 -and further before X OA -where becomes equal to , but turns out to be negative. The open access stock level (X OA ) is the smallest, yet just slightly smaller than the others. As expected from standard theory on renewable resources, the economic rent at this level is zero. At any other equilibrium point, it is non-zero and positive. But it is the highest at BESF, which minimises the throughput of maintaining stocks by requiring the supply of their emissions removal services ( ) always to be positive. Finally, by comparing the optimal stock levels (X t * ), in Table 6 , with the observed ones (X t ), in Table  5 , it can be inferred when each equilibrium scenario must have occurred. It is worrying to ascertain that all of them are already gone somewhere between 1998 and 1999. 
16
The open access stock level (X OA ) is the smallest, yet just slightly smaller than the others. As
17
expected from standard theory on renewable resources, the economic rent at this level is zero.
18
At any other equilibrium point, it is non-zero and positive. But it is the highest at BESF, which 
21
Finally, by comparing the optimal stock levels (X t * ), in Table 6 , with the observed ones (X t ), in 22 and can be plotted together, the barter ratio between them is 10 GtC of per 10 MtC of , as the vertical axis of the graph in Figure 3 indicates. More simply, this barter ratio can be expressed as 1 GtC : 1 MtC, which means 10 -3 MtC : 1 MtC. Therefore, so that rates of return and depletion can be compared with one another, the former must be multiplied by 10 -3 . (e) First derivative of Eq. (21). Table 6 . Removal market equilibrium analysis 
5
However, so that Ĝ(X t ) and ĥ t can be plotted together, the barter ratio between them is 10 GtC of Ĝ(X t ) per 10 MtC 6 of ĥ t , as the vertical axis of the graph in Figure 3 indicates. More simply, this barter ratio can be expressed as 1 GtC : 1
MtC, which means 10 3 MtC : 1 MtC. Therefore, so that rates of return and depletion can be compared with one anoth-er, the former must be multiplied by 10 -3 . (e) First derivative of Eq. (21). (14)) -the bio-economic exchange rate 3 -is defined as the ratio of ecological debt -excess demand for removal services (supply of 4 emissions) -to ecological credit -excess supply of removal services (demand for emissions).
Although it is an underlying variable, it stands for the shadow price measuring, along an optimal 6 path through time, the marginal bio-economic value of the forestland asset [19] . When the 7 speed k of economic activity drives deforestation, forestland shrinks and thus ε is expected to 8 rise (depreciate).
9
Since ε critically and ultimately depends on λ and k, it must, to begin with, be expressed in 10 terms of them. Methodologically, this can be first accomplished by fixing k = k = 1.00023, given 11 in the last row of Table 4 . Then this rate is assumed to hold for every year according to the 12 following rule:
where X t ' is the stock level that would be observed in column X t of Table 5 , if k = k= 1.0023.
14
As λ changes, so will ε -whose calculation follows Eqs. (11) 
Eq. (30) stands for the aggregate emissions demand or removal supply function in the long run.
22
REDD
Aggregate emissions supply or removal demand function (k ( ε ) )
1 By a similar procedure, the functional relationship between ε and k, as well as between k and 2 ε, can then be calculated. This time, though, the variable made fixed is λ = λ= 7.975, given in 3 the last row of Table 4 . This value is kept unchanged for each two consecutive years, to either 4 of which Eqs. (1) and (3) apply:
By substituting Eq. (3)a into Eq. (1)a, it turns out that: (11), (6), (2), (9) and (14) . Also, like before, so as to inquire into the effects of (Table 7 and Table 8 ). The most useful results shown by Table   1 8 are those displayed in its last two columns. They make clear how much the natural forest 2 and the economy are expected to grow annually, through 25 years, in each scenario.
3
It is noteworthy that a stringent conservation scenario, such as REDD1, requires an optimal 4 value for λ (λ REDD1 * = 5.787) that is not too far from its observed mean value, displayed in the 5 last row and column of Table 4 (λ = 7.975). Thus, the allowed annual deforestation rate through 6 25 years (Eq. (33)) is 3.18% p.a. (last column of Table 8 ). This figure might sound startling when 
15
( Figure 7 ). Figure 5 shows that the supply of emissions (k) is nearly perfectly inelastic to the 16 shadow price ε, whereas the removal of them (λ) dramatically falls with the rise of ε. Although
17
at some high value of ε, the demand for removal also becomes almost inelastic to price changes,
18
this only happens at very low levels of existing removal stocks, when thus λ→ 1 (Eq. (3)) and 
Macro-bio-economic scenarios
d on Eqs. (30) and (32), REDD, CDM and BAU scenarios are tested to understand how well conservation (REDD) a ensation (CDM) strategies can do as compared with business-as-usual (BAU) ones (Table 7 and Table 8 ). The most use ts shown by Table 8 are those displayed in its last two columns. They make clear how much the natural forest and omy are expected to grow annually, through 25 years, in each scenario.
noteworthy that a stringent conservation scenario, such as REDD1, requires an optimal value for λ ( REDD1 * = 5.787) that is ar from its observed mean value, displayed in the last line and column of Table 4 ( ̅ = 7.975). Thus, the allowed ann restation rate through 25 years (Eq. (33)) is 3.18% p.a. (last column of Table 8 ). This figure might sound startling wh ared, for instance, with the deforestation rate in the Brazilian Legal Amazon for a single year: just between August 2012 a st 2013, this rate reached 20% [31]! However, neither would more "economic growth-driven" strategies (CDM and BAU such a high annual deforestation rate. Nearly all of them (last four rows and last column of Table 8 ) would allow for a yea restation rate of about 7.8%. On the other hand, a 100% rate of deforestation reduction, even spread over 25 years (scena D2), would render no more than an economic growth rate as low as 0.00149% (last column of Table 8 ). These numbers h some light on the feasibility of the targets set by deforestation reduction programmes [29] (Figure 7 ). Figure 5 shows that ly of emissions ( ) is nearly perfectly inelastic to the shadow price ε, whereas the removal of them ( ) dramatically falls with of ε. Although at some high value of ε, the demand for removal also becomes almost inelastic to price changes, this o ens at very low levels of existing removal stocks, when thus → 1 (Eq. (3)) and the share of forest conservation approac of deforestation (v → u) or becomes even smaller (v < u). Table 4 , k is much smaller than λ, the greater of them must be scaled down through logarithms to m comparable. (b) Growth rate for λ that would smooth, over 25 years (1988-2012) , the accumulated deforestation reduction r ed by a 7-year programme, from 2007 to 2015, for reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon [29] . The annual reduct for every period t = 1,..., 7 are, respectively, 25%, 25%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 75% and 100%. The "capitalisation" (multiplication ese rates yields 7.4648438, which amounts to the full figure to be reached in 7 years. This 7-year time is factored into a 25-y d, thereby yielding 3.5714286 sub-periods, over which the deforestation reduction rate accumulated during 7 years is spr ding to its geometric mean √7. . The annual reduction rates for every period t = 1,..., 7 are, respectively, 25%, 25%, 30%, 40%,
25
50%, 75% and 100%. The "capitalisation" (multiplication) of all these rates yields 7.4648438, which amounts to the full 26 figure to be reached in 7 years. This 7-year time is factored into a 25-year period, thereby yielding 3.5714286 sub-periods,
27
over which the deforestation reduction rate accumulated during 7 years is spread according to its geometric mean 28 ( 7.4648438 
growth-driven" strategies (CDM and BAU's) stand such a high annual deforestation rate. Nearly all of them (last four rows and last column of Table 8 ) would allow for a yearly deforestation rate of about 7.8%. On the other hand, a 100% rate of deforestation reduction, even spread over 25 years (scenario REDD2), would render no more than an economic growth rate as low as 0.00149% (last column of Table 8 ). These numbers help shed some light on the feasibility of the targets set by deforestation reduction programmes [29] (Figure 7 ). Figure 5 shows that the supply of emissions ( ) is nearly perfectly inelastic to the shadow price ε, whereas the removal of them ( ) dramatically falls with the rise of ε. Although at some high value of ε, the demand for removal also becomes almost inelastic to price changes, this only happens at very low levels of existing removal stocks, when thus → 1 (Eq. (3)) and the share of forest conservation approaches that of deforestation (v → u) or becomes even smaller (v < u). 
Removal trade 6
Now, the optimal values for ε brought to light in Table 8 can be used in Table 9 to define, as 7 in Figure 2 .b, the amount of removal loans across the space (Z) and over time (M). Of course, as shown in Eqs. (36) and (37) define, respectively, the optimal path of conservation (REDD) and compensation (CDM) to be loaned out in the long run (Figure 6 .a). Since conservation is the surplus of carbon removal services, they can be exported (lent) to somewhere else. On the other hand, when these missing services have nevertheless been used, some compensation is due. However, compensating for environmental services that were already lacking before implies importing (borrowing) them from somewhere. In this sense, conservation (exports) defines an excess supply of removal services, while compensation (imports) is caused by an excess demand for removal services. If these services are to be loaned out, the sink yielding conservation lends them, whereas the sink owing compensation borrows them. In any event, the demand for these loans, as shown in Figure 2 , lies behind disaggregate (Figure 3 ) -periodical -and aggregate ( Figure 5 ) -long run -removal needs. As long as B (last column of Table 9 ) stands for the balance of carbon trading loans, it is interesting to note that a stringent scenario, such as REDD1 (Table 7) , yields more ecological debt ( ) than ecological credit ( ). This when these missing services have nevertheless been already used, some compensation is due.
8
However, compensating for environmental services that were already lacking before implies 9 importing (borrowing) them from somewhere. In this sense, conservation (exports) defines an excess supply of removal services, while compensation (imports) is caused by an excess demand 11 for removal services. If these services are to be loaned out, the sink yielding conservation lends 12 them, whereas the sink owing compensation borrows them.
13
In any event, the demand for these loans, as shown in Figure 2 , lies behind disaggregate ( Figure   14 3) -periodical -and aggregate ( Figure 5 ) -long run -removal needs. As long as B (last 15 column of Table 9 ) stands for the balance of carbon trading loans, it is interesting to note that again. From then on, it becomes increasingly negative, and neither the CDM nor BAU scenario 1 can turn it over anymore.
2
Actually, CDM and BAU1 are but very loose scenarios. When they come into play, the 3 ecological credit region (1.799 ≤ε≤ 10.621) has already been left behind. Therefore, in spite of 4 the high values for ε set by CDM and BAU scenarios, these prices appear to be too low to 5 prevent B < 0. Although CDM requires that ln λ = ln k (Table 7 and Table 8 
Target setting
12 Table 10 focuses on scenario REDD1, from Table 8 , in order to demonstrate how an economy
13
can be ecologically guided. Of course, the figures in Table 10 do not account for the real picture.
14 Rather, they relate to a 25-year deforestation period , to show how things would 15 look if it had followed out the optimal path suggested by the conservation scenario REDD1.
16
The percentages in the last column of Table 10 were merged in such a way that the 25-year
17
period is divided into 7 time lags. By so doing, REDD1 reduction path, although applying to 
20
Nevertheless, it can still be asked why the percentage deforestation rate along the optimal path 21 in ). Actually, the underlying reason for the mismatch between 26 deforestation rates in Table 10 and in Table 8 is that the rates in the former are bounded (Eq.
27
(33)), whereas those in the latter are unbounded. This difference can be grasped from combining
28
Eqs. (1) antepenult column of Table 10 .
5
The deforested area in Table 10 is given by Eq. (39). Its size follows closely -yet throughout Remaining deforest. 5 Table 10 . Deforestation targets and rates from optimal results in the REDD1 scenario (λ * = 5.7874) (Table 8 
Conclusion
10
The analysis carried out so far has demonstrated that, where policy climate and deforestation
11
are concerned, carbon conservation (REDD) and compensation (CDM) entail a trade-off that 12 cannot be overcome by monetary mechanisms. Instead of money, the underlying variable 13 which forest value rests upon is the bio-diversity ratio (λ). Although it is typically a space-
14
based measure, this ratio also accounts for forestland distribution over time. When λ is affected
15
by the demand of removal stocks (h) set off by the emissions growth from the economy, the amount of compensation (M) for these emissions over time is assumed to feed on the conser-scenario, it deteriorates the balance of carbon trading loans even further. Quite often, economy-
11
wise price setting and policy-making grow apart from ecological conditions. 
15
Shifting from a deforestation avoidance approach to a forest stock maintenance one would
16
certainly be a step forward. While the former carries a misleadingly uneconomic meaning, the 
32
Pacto pela Valorização da Floresta e pelo Fim do Desmatamento na Amazônia Brasi-
